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Getting Back to Our ‘Roots’: Why the Use of 
Cutting Edge Forensic Technology in the 
Courtroom Should (and Can) Still be Constrained 
by the Plain Language of the Confrontation Clause 
Lucie Bernheim 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of scientific evidence such as DNA tests in court . . . brings 
into collaboration two institutions with significantly different aims 
and normative commitments. . . . Lawmakers’ expectations of science 
to simply step in and cure the law’s deficiencies, without taking into 
account the disparate dynamics of the two institutions, are 
exaggerated, . . . and, at the limit, lead to questionable justice.1 
In 2001, Elaina Boussiacos’s body was found in the trunk of her car near her 
home in Woodinville, Washington.2 Sione Lui, an ex-boyfriend of the 
decedent, was considered a suspect.3 Nine identifiable fingerprints, a small 
bloodstain, and a trace of DNA on the steering wheel were found at the scene, 
none of which matched those of Mr. Lui’s or Ms. Boussiacos’s.4 A small 
number of sperm cells that matched Mr. Lui were found on the decedent’s 
underwear and vaginal swab. It was unclear how long the cells had been 
present; indeed, it was conceded that they could have been there for a “long 
time.”5 A private DNA testing company, Orchid Cell Mart, tested the DNA.6 
                                                      
1 Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 328, 329 (2006). 
2 Corrected Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 




6 State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 951 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), petition for cert. granted, 228 
P.3d 17 (Wash). 
888 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
The state did not initially charge Mr. Lui, and the case remained “unsolved” 
until 2007.7 In 2007, detectives spoke with Mr. Lui again.8 During this 
meeting, Mr. Lui made statements inconsistent with those he had made in 
2001, but did not confess to anything.9 Based on both the evidence gathered 
just after the crime in 2001 and his inconsistent statements, Mr. Lui was 
charged with the murder six years after Ms. Boussiacos was killed.10 
At trial, the report showing a DNA profile from the crime scene that 
matched that of Mr. Lui was not admitted into evidence, and the lab analyst 
that produced it did not testify.11 Instead, the results of the DNA report were 
introduced through the testimony of Gina Pineda, an associate director at 
Orchid Cell Mart, as an expert witness.12 Ms. Pineda gave testimony that 
included her opinions and conclusions based on the reports, even though she 
had not been involved with the testing process.13 Mr. Lui objected to this 
practice, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against 
him had been violated because he had not had the opportunity to cross-
examine the DNA lab analyst who had produced the report; cross-examining 
Ms. Pineda was no substitute.14 The trial court disagreed, and Mr. Lui was 
convicted of second-degree murder.15 
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division I, affirmed, stating that Mr. 
Lui’s confrontation rights were not violated because “the evidence against Lui 
was [Ms. Pineda’s] opinion—not [the] underlying data.”16 Since Mr. Lui had 
the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Pineda regarding her opinion, the court 
                                                      
7 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), petition 




11 Lui, 221 P.3d at 955 . 
12 Id. at 951. 
13 Id. at 955. 
14 Id. at 953. 
15 Id. at 949. 
16 Id. at 955. 
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reasoned, the confrontation clause was satisfied.17 The Washington State 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and it heard the case on September 14, 
2010.18 The court has not issued an opinion, but the outcome will likely depend 
on how the Supreme Court of the United States decides Williams v. Illinois, 
which is currently pending.19 Mr. Lui’s predicament, therefore, is an example 
of the latest question that the US Supreme Court has had the opportunity to 
answer in a relatively new line of confrontation clause cases—who is required 
to testify to satisfy the confrontation clause?20 
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution 
provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . 
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”21 This right is unique in 
that it is only afforded to the accused in criminal cases.22 The defendant’s right 
to confront witnesses against him, or to cross-examine witnesses, is commonly 
recognized as an invaluable tool for exposing witness incompetency or 
dishonesty.23 
Despite the amendment’s seemingly clear language (“shall enjoy the 
right”),24 until 2004, the confrontation of a witness with adverse testimony was 
not required if the witness was unavailable and the trial judge decided that the 
                                                      
17 Id. at 956. 
18 Washington State Supreme Court: State v. Liu (TVW television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2010, 
1:30 PM), available at  
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010090059C&TYPE=V&CFID=754579
&CFTOKEN=79754641&bhcp=1. 
19 Williams v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 BNW 
U.S.L.W. 3003 (U.S. June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505). Oral argument occurred on December 6, 
2011. See Williams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/williams-v-illinois/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
20 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305 (2009). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
22 Id. 
23 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004) (“The substance of the constitutional 
protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness 
face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.”). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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testimony was reliable.25 Ohio v. Roberts provided that testimony could be 
deemed reliable if it either fell within a hearsay exception or showed 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”26 The US Supreme Court 
reasoned that if the right to confrontation operated to ensure reliability of out-
of-court statements, then the constitutional requirement could be disposed of 
when a judge had already determined that the evidence was reliable.27 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court overturned Ohio v. Roberts in 
Crawford v. Washington. The Court held that the admission of “testimonial 
hearsay” is clearly prohibited by the confrontation clause unless the witness is 
both unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.28 Six years after Crawford, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
elaborated on whether “forensic certificates of analysis” qualify as 
testimonial.29 Determining whether forensic evidence is “testimonial hearsay,” 
which governs when a defendant can invoke her right to confront, is 
particularly important because of the perceived infallibility of forensic 
evidence—especially DNA test results.30 
In a case like that of Mr. Lui, exposing lab analyst incompetency, 
inexperience, bias, or dishonesty through cross-examination is one of the 
                                                      
25 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Court noted, however, that a showing of 
unavailability is not always required. An earlier case, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), 
had “found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution 
to produce a seemingly available witness.” Id. at 65 n.7. 
26 Id. at 63–64, 66. 
27 Id. 
28 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
29 The “certificates of analysis” were sworn certificates of state laboratory analysts stating 
that material seized by police was cocaine of a certain quality. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 
321–22. 
30 See Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 328 (noting that modern society believes that “science can 
deliver failsafe, and therefore just, legal outcomes where the law, acting on its own, might 
fall short”). Jasonoff suggests that one reason for the perceived infallibility of science is the 
notion that science establishes truth through non-human instruments, such as a lie detector or 
an identification technique. Id. at 331–32. Unfortunately, the risk of human error can never 
actually be removed, since such non-human instruments are made “to speak” only with the 
aid of trained professionals. Id. at 330. 
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defendant’s few tools for undermining such damning evidence. While DNA 
evidence can be extremely accurate, it is not immune from human error. 
Erroneous results are not uncommon due to risks like cross contamination, the 
DNA analyst’s subjective and often inaccurate interpretation of the test results, 
or completely fabricated results (“cooking the data”).31 Ironically, as DNA 
testing technology becomes more sensitive and can pick up smaller traces of 
cells, the risk of contamination from lab equipment, technicians, or other 
samples is more likely.32 While there is a widespread belief “that science can 
deliver failsafe [sic], and therefore just, legal outcomes where the law, acting 
on its own, might fall short,”33 a more realistic expectation for science’s role in 
legal proceedings is that forensic tests and results are simply pieces of 
evidence. Results of a DNA test are no different from any other evidence. “It is 
the product of human beings, with the same potential prejudices and 
inconsistencies inherent in any human expression.”34 Just as an eyewitness 
may be impeached at trial, so a forensic result should be prodded and poked by 
the defense on cross-examination of the lab analyst who performed the test to 
uncover, for example, the analyst’s biases or inadequacies. Without adequate 
cross-examination, jurors are likely to view forensic evidence as much more 
probative than it actually is. 
While the forensic community has recently received negative attention for a 
range of serious problems, most notably in a 2009 report by the National 
Academy of Sciences,35 the use of forensic testing in the criminal justice 
                                                      
31 SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 298 (2011). 
32 Id. at 278. 
33 Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 328. 
34 KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
35 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. COMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (noting that 
forensic testing systems around the country are lacking in standards and certification 
programs). 
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system is continuing to increase dramatically.36 In the past fifteen years, DNA-
based identification has come to be heavily relied upon by law enforcement.37 
For example, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a computer DNA 
data bank overseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, connects DNA 
databases of all fifty states.38 Originally, the data banks were meant to hold the 
DNA profiles of only violent felons and recidivist sex offenders.39 Since 
CODIS’s inception in 1990, however, state DNA data bank development has 
increased significantly. There is a growing emphasis on the inclusion of 
profiles of juvenile offenders, misdemeanants, and individuals who are 
arrested but never convicted. Besides the stigmatizing impact of being present 
in CODIS, an individual whose profile is on CODIS is more likely to be 
considered a suspect in a crime (because of the likelihood of a “match”) than 
an individual whose profile is not in the database. While this article only 
explores the use of DNA at trial, it is relevant to note that DNA is increasingly 
being used as a surveillance tool through data banks. 
Finally, because of the nature of cases where DNA evidence is usually used, 
the stakes are likely to be extremely high for the defendant. Since DNA residue 
is found in blood, hair, skin cells, saliva, and semen, DNA testing is often used 
in rape and murder trials after such materials are left behind. Consequently, the 
defendant’s punishment, if convicted, is likely to be severe. Moreover, the 
American judicial system’s emphasis on the principle of finality makes it 
increasingly difficult to reopen a conviction:40 “While state authorities have 
fully embraced the use of DNA to place individuals behind bars, some have 
been far more reluctant to open the door to post-conviction DNA testing.”41 
                                                      
36 See Id. at 41. This article groups DNA analysis with other methods of forensic testing 
even though DNA analysis is “considered the most reliable forensic tool available today.” 
Id. at 47. Though reliable, it is not foolproof, and laboratories testing DNA can still make 
errors “such as mislabeling samples, losing samples, or misinterpreting data.” Id.  
37 KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at xvi. 
38 Id. at 29. 
39 Id. at 28. 
40 Id. at 329. 
41 Id. 
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With such high stakes, and with the importance of seriously questioning the 
accuracy of the DNA evidence before the conviction, confrontation of the 
DNA analyst who performed the test is essential. 
Citing efficiency and economic concerns, as well as the neutral and 
infallible nature of forensic evidence, however, some states have been 
extremely hesitant to fully comply with Crawford and Melendez-Diaz in the 
forensic context. For the various reasons discussed below, the analyst who 
prepared the forensic report, like in State v. Lui, is not always required to 
appear in court and be subject to cross-examination. On the other hand, several 
cities have required the analyst who conducted the test to appear in court in all 
or most cases, demonstrating that other states’ concerns about overwhelming 
cost and inefficiency may be largely unfounded.42 Any increase in the burden 
on states to require the analyst to appear in every case, however, is a 
constitutionally required cost.43 The more that non-complying states are able to 
evade the Supreme Court’s newly articulated constitutional requirements 
regarding confrontation and forensic testing, the more defendants are subjected 
to unconstitutional practices. 
This article argues that the defendant has the right to confront the analyst 
who conducted the forensic test; in-court testimony from an analyst’s 
supervisor or an expert witness who was not directly involved is insufficient. 
Further, in order to answer the question of who is required to testify regarding 
the results of a forensic test under the confrontation clause (a question 
currently before both the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Lui and 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Williams v. Illinois), courts should 
                                                      
42 Examples of cities that already have a practice of calling the analysts who examined the 
evidence, drew the conclusion, or wrote the report are: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, 
Colorado; San Francisco, California; Oakland, California; Seattle, Washington; Chicago, 
Illinois; and Anchorage, Alaska. 
43 Brief for Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) 
[hereinafter Bullcoming Amici Curiae Brief by defender organizations]. 
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look to the plain language of the confrontation clause44 and the basic principles 
underlying the recent Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz decisions regarding 
what is testimonial hearsay. Based on the principles contained in those 
decisions, the defendant has the right to confront the analyst who conducted 
the test. In-court testimony from an analyst’s supervisor or an expert witness 
who was not involved in the testing is insufficient because it shields the analyst 
who actually performed the test from cross-examination, while still allowing 
the analyst’s testimony to threaten a defendant’s liberty. Confronting a witness 
may not be a perfect science, but forensic test results should not replace it. 
 Part I provides a brief history of the confrontation clause up to Davis v. 
Washington and sets out principles the Court should continue to apply in 
Williams v. Illinois.45 Part II addresses the intersection of new confrontation 
requirements and forensic evidence, focusing on both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz to emphasize that changes in how we 
think of scientific evidence and in the forensic testing structure itself are 
necessary to ensure that criminal defendants have a meaningful right to 
confront witnesses against them. Part III examines Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico46 and Williams v. Illinois47 to illustrate how some states are evading the 
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz requirements when determining who is required 
to testify under the confrontation clause. Finally, Part IV describes the systems 
in states that have successfully complied with the principles of Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz—“the sky has not fallen,” as noted by the majority in the 
Bullcoming opinion.48 Part IV also recommends changes in non-complying 
                                                      
44 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . 
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). 
45 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
46 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
47 Williams v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). 
48 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719. Though costs and inefficiency are irrelevant once a 
constitutional right has been recognized, the issue has affected how courts have dealt with 
lab analyst testimony requirements, and so it should be addressed. 
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states’ forensic structures and procedures that could make compliance easier 
while decreasing the risk of inadvertent error. 
I. A HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT CONFRONTATION PRECEDENT 
A. Why Cross-Examination Is Important: The Treason Trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh to the Cross-Examination Skills of Perry Mason 
In reaction to a case involving Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 and others like it, 
English laws developed practices that limited ex parte abuses by ensuring the 
right of the accused to confront every adverse witness, face to face.49 Raleigh 
was accused of conspiring to kill James I.50 Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord 
Cobham, had implicated him without notice to or argument from the defense—
a record of Cobham’s statements was simply read to the jury during Raleigh’s 
trial.51 Raleigh demanded that the judges call Cobham to appear, suspecting he 
would recant, stating that “[t]he proof of the common law is by witness and 
jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face.”52 
Raleigh’s request was denied; the jury convicted him of treason and he was 
sentenced to death without ever having the opportunity to confront Cobham.53 
Looking to this English precedent, the confrontation clause was included in 
the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.54 The Supreme Court first spoke to cross-examination in a 
criminal case as a core component of the confrontation right in Mattox v. 
United States: “[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to 
the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to 
                                                      
49 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44–45 (2004). 
50 Id. at 44. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 49. 
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face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination. This, the law 
says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of.”55 
More recently, Earle Stanley Gardner popularized cross-examination 
through the Perry Mason mystery novels. Perry Mason represented, for the 
most part, defendants charged with crimes that they in fact did not commit. 
While exceptionally idealized, Perry Mason’s character represents the long-
held faith that the legal system has in the impact of cross-examination in 
revealing witness dishonesty, incompetence, and incredibility—cross-
examination is as much about testing the witness’s perceptions and memory as 
it is about testing his or her sincerity.56 
B. Pointer v. Texas, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Ohio v. Roberts—the 
Confrontation Clause’s Relation to Hearsay, and Emphasis on Reliability 
Despite its history and lofty depictions in the media, the confrontation clause 
was relatively underdeveloped until recently.57 Previously, courts depended on 
the common law of hearsay to determine whether evidence could be admitted 
without a testifying witness.58 “Hearsay” is defined as an out-of-court 
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted59 and is inadmissible 
unless it falls within an exception.60 Rules governing admissibility of out-of-
court statements are subject to exceptions based upon principles of reliability.61 
                                                      
55 Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and 
‘At Risk’, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 432 (2009) (emphasis added). 
56 Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, 
and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2010); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s 
Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and 
Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008). 
57 Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 
1014 (1998). 
58 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
59 FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
60 FED. R. EVID. 802. 
61 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
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The common law of hearsay was furthered by the adoption of Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1975, which was subsequently adopted by most states.62 
In Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court finally held that the confrontation 
clause is applicable to the states.63 Not much changed, however; as one scholar 
pointed out, “shortly after Pointer the Court tended to emphasize the extent to 
which the confrontation clause and hearsay doctrines are distinct[,] . . . [after 
Ohio v. Roberts in 1980,] the Court . . . emphasized the extent to which they 
are similar.”64 
Indeed, in Ohio v. Roberts, the scope of the law of hearsay and the 
confrontation clause were completely integrated.65 The Supreme Court held 
that an admission at trial of an absent witness’s preliminary hearing testimony 
did not violate a defendant’s confrontation right when the witness was 
unavailable and the statement bore adequate “indicia of reliability.”66 Herschel 
Roberts, the defendant in that case, was charged with forgery of a check and 
possession of stolen credit cards.67 At the preliminary hearing, the witness in 
question testified that she knew the respondent, but did not allow Mr. Roberts 
to use the checks and credit cards in question.68 The witness was unavailable 
for the trial, but the trial court admitted the transcript of her preliminary 
testimony anyway over Mr. Roberts’s confrontation objections.69 Ultimately, 
he was convicted on all counts.70 
Deeming the admission of the statement proper, the Roberts Court reasoned 
that the point of the confrontation clause was to ensure accuracy in criminal 
proceedings. As long as a court only admitted reliable hearsay, there was no 
                                                      
62 Friedman, supra note 57, at 1020. 
63 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965). 
64 Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 555 
(2007). 
65 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 58. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 60. 
70 Id. 
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need for cross-examination. Reliability was to be determined either by looking 
to the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence or by allowing the 
judge to subjectively determine whether the evidence displayed “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”71 According to the Court, because “hearsay 
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar 
values,” it could rely on hearsay to determine what was reliable.72 
 Despite the Constitution’s clear preference for assessing reliability through 
confrontation, Roberts attempted to arrive at the desired result of reliability 
through a different framework. After Roberts and until 2004, the admission of 
hearsay against a defendant hinged only upon the rules of hearsay and a 
judge’s subjective assessment of the reliability of the evidence, in spite of the 
Constitution’s clear language to the contrary. This subjective test proved to be 
too much for the Court and came to a head in Crawford v. Washington. 
C. Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington—a Shift from a Focus 
on Reliability to a New Focus on the Definition of “Testimonial” 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Court held that the confrontation clause bars 
the admission of any testimonial hearsay when the witness does not appear at 
trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.73 Completely replacing the Roberts subjective 
reliability test, the admissibility of unconfronted evidence now hinges on what 
the Court considers “testimonial” hearsay. In Crawford, Michael Crawford had 
stabbed a man who he claimed attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia Crawford.74 
While in police custody, Ms. Crawford gave a tape-recorded statement to the 
police; the State used the recording at trial, and Mr. Crawford did not cross-
examine his wife.75 
                                                      
71 Id. at 66. 
72 Id. 
73 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
74 Id. at 38. 
75 Id. at 40, 65. 
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At trial, the court admitted the statement because it found it trustworthy 
under the Roberts standard and convicted Mr. Crawford.76 The Washington 
Court of Appeals reversed, applying a nine-factor test to assess reliability and 
determining that Ms. Crawford’s statements were not reliable.77 The 
Washington Supreme Court reversed again, concluding that the statements 
were reliable under Roberts.78 The United States Supreme Court reversed yet 
again, abrogating the Roberts test and stating that the lower courts’ decisions 
in Crawford were “a self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable 
and inconsistent application.”79 
The Court criticized the Roberts test for its unpredictability and for 
collapsing the hearsay doctrine and the confrontation requirements together.80 
The Roberts reliability test was overly broad in that it applied whether or not 
the statement or declaration in question was testimonial hearsay—thus 
subjecting to constitutional scrutiny statements that are “far removed” from the 
concerns of confrontation such as offhand, informal statements not made in 
anticipation of litigation.81 In addition, the test was too narrow in that it 
allowed unconfronted testimony to be admitted if it was found reliable because 
it fell under an established hearsay exception or was deemed trustworthy by 
the judge.82 The clause’s ultimate goal, according to the Crawford court, was 
not only to ensure reliability, but to guarantee a defendant the right to ensure 
the reliability of testimonial evidence against him through a specific process: 
confrontation.83 Therefore, if a piece of evidence is testimonial, whether it falls 
                                                      
76 Id. at 40. 
77 Id. at 41. 
78 Id. at 41; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
79 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66, 68. 
80 Id. at 63. 
81 Id. at 60. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 61. 
900 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
into a state or federal hearsay exception is irrelevant for purposes of the 
confrontation clause.84 
Most criticism of Crawford is directed at its less-than-complete definition of 
what courts should consider testimonial85—some have even argued that 
Crawford simply replaced one subjective test with another.86 However, the 
Court did provide some preliminary guidelines regarding what should be 
considered testimonial, which “share a common nucleus and then define the 
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”87 Specifically, the 
Court cited three testimonial categories: “ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent,” which includes affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony, or “statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorily”;88 “extrajudicial statements contained in formalized materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”;89 and 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial. ”90 
The Court’s somewhat nebulous definition of “testimonial” has been 
defended on the grounds that the rule is extremely new, and it cannot be 
expected that all significant questions be resolved right away.91 The Court 
recognized that its non-exhaustive list may cause uncertainty, but it excused its 
                                                      
84 John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Crime Labs and Prison Guards: A Comment on 
Melendez-Diaz and Its Potential Impact on Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 3 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 205, 212 (2009). 
85 See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v. 
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM. L. 
REV. 115, 135 (2010); Henry F. Fradella, Unraveling Crawford in Abuse Cases, 42 No. 1 
Crim. Law Bulletin ART 6 (2006). 
86 Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)discretion: How Courts Circumvent the 
Confrontation Clause under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 778 (2008). 
87 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004). 
88 Id. at 51. 
89 Id. at 51–52. 
90 Id. at 52. 
91 Friedman, supra note 64, at 555. 
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own shortcoming because the result could "hardly be worse than [Roberts].”92 
Indeed, the Court may have been more ambiguous than necessary in order to 
avoid the pigeonholing of testimonial categories and to encourage lower courts 
to consider the motivation behind Crawford—that the truth-seeking purpose of 
a criminal trial is undermined by admitting incriminating evidence without first 
providing an opportunity for cross-examination of the witness that produced 
it—and apply its rule, even if the evidence is not specifically listed as with a 
testimonial category.93 Still, the ambiguity of the decision has the potential to 
confuse trial and appellate courts trying to distinguish between testimonial and 
nontestimonial evidence. 
Davis v. Washington built upon Crawford’s definition of testimonial.94 In 
Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether statements made in an 
emergency situation qualified as “testimonial” under any of the categories set 
out in Crawford.95 The Court decided that statements are nontestimonial when 
made during an interrogation if the circumstances objectively indicate that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police to respond to an 
ongoing emergency.96 Michelle McCottry called a 911 operator and claimed 
that Adrian Davis had assaulted her.97 Because the Court determined that the 
primary purpose of these statements was to enable police to meet an ongoing 
emergency, the recording of the 911 call was considered nontestimonial and, 
therefore, admissible, even though Ms. McCottry did not testify at Mr. Davis’s 
trial.98 Conversely, statements are testimonial when the circumstances 
                                                      
92 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10. 
93 Purported confusion may actually be an unwillingness to apply the rule. See, e.g., State v. 
Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 953–54 (noting that the Crawford Court “listed three possible 
formulations for the ‘core class’ of testimonial statements . . . . The Court did not endorse 
any of these formulations because the statements at issue—made in response to law 
enforcement interrogation—qualified under all of them.”) (emphasis added). 
94 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
95 Id. at 823. 
96 Id. at 822. 
97  Id. at 817. 
98  Id. at 828. 
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objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution or when 
statements are an obvious substitute for live testimony because they do 
precisely what a witness does on direct examination.99 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT 
AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE: WHAT IS REQUIRED? 
Humans have twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that are contained within 
the nucleus of each cell, and these chromosomes make up DNA.100 As 
mentioned above, crimes like murder and rape tend to leave the most DNA 
evidence behind; consequently, DNA is often gathered, processed, and 
presented at murder and rape trials.101 Because it is generally recognized that, 
except for identical twins, no two people can have identical sets of base pairs 
of DNA,102 the introduction of DNA-related technologies has obvious benefits. 
If a DNA profile found at a crime scene matches the DNA profile of a suspect, 
evidence of the match is highly probative at trial. 
If samples are perfectly handled and gathered, the risk of DNA error is 
slight.103 For this reason, DNA profiling technology is also powerful 
exculpatory evidence. As of November 2011, for example, 289 imprisoned 
individuals had been exonerated through DNA, after having spent, on average, 
thirteen years in prison.104 Whatever the reliability of DNA profiling 
technology itself, it is undoubtedly compromised by human error.105 The risk 
                                                      
99 Id. at 822, 830. 
100 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE CONTROVERSY IN 
THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 9 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2007). 
101 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). 
102
 KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at 285-86. 
103  Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine is Dead; Long Live Self-Incrimination 
Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of the Liberal State, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815 (2008). 
104 Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
105 Bilz, supra note 103, at 815. 
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of human error is compounded, especially in murder and rape trials, if the 
public views scientific evidence as more reliable than it actually is. Therefore, 
although it is undeniably useful, it is extremely important that the public not 
consider DNA evidence infallible. 
 One method that can be used to diminish the adverse effect of human error 
in DNA results is to allow a defendant to confront at trial the lab analyst who 
performed the test. However, lab analysts who perform the tests often do not 
appear in court for reasons detailed in Part III.106 In order to compel lab 
analysts to appear for cross-examination, courts must determine that forensic 
test results fall into the Crawford definition of “testimonial hearsay.”107 If 
forensic test results are deemed testimonial, they cannot be admitted into 
evidence without the testimony of the analyst who performed the test.108 
Melendez-Diaz took the first step in this direction, finding that a particular type 
of forensic evidence constitutes testimonial hearsay.109 
A. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
In 2009, the US Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that 
“certificates of analysis,” which show the results of a forensic analysis 
performed on a seized substance, were within the core class of testimonial 
statements that require the lab analyst that performed the test to appear under 
Crawford.110 The Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz addressed the problem of 
categorizing forensic certificates that succinctly state the results of a drug 
test.111 While Melendez-Diaz took a step in the direction of clarifying what the 
confrontation clause requires with respect to forensic test results,112 it left 
many questions unanswered. Due to those perceived ambiguities and 
                                                      
106 See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Williams v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
107 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
108 Id. at 53–54. 
109 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 319–20. 
112 Id. at 321. 
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additional concerns for cost and efficiency, many state courts continue to 
circumvent the confrontation clause in the forensic context, and thereby 
deprive criminal defendants of a constitutional right.113 
Mr. Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distributing and trafficking cocaine 
without having had the opportunity to confront the analysts who swore to the 
results of the forensic analysis performed on substances seized at his arrest.114 
Melendez-Diaz’s person was searched, and officers found four clear plastic 
bags containing a white substance.115 After he was taken to the police station, 
officers searched the police cruiser and found what appeared to be more drugs 
hidden in the backseat.116 At trial, the prosecution submitted the certificates of 
analysis of the seized substances, which indicated the substance was 
cocaine.117 Melendez-Diaz was convicted despite his objections that Crawford 
required the analysts who performed the tests to testify in person.118 
According to the Supreme Court, the certificates were clearly testimonial 
because they had been created for use at trial and qualified as affidavits: 
[N]ot only were the affidavits ‘made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ as required by 
Crawford, but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the 
affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance. We can safely 
assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary 
purpose, since that purpose—as stated in the relevant state-law 
provision—was reprinted on the affidavits themselves.119 
                                                      
113 Cicchini, supra note 86, at 754. 
114 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
115 Id. at 319–20. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 320. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 321 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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Additionally, because the certificates were sworn before a notary public, 
they qualified as formalized materials and were therefore testimonial.120 Since 
the certificates were clearly affidavits, the Court could have ended its analysis 
there. But in order to prevent its holding from being cabined to sworn 
statements, the Court also looked to the primary purpose of the certificates; it 
emphasized that, without the formality of an affidavit, a statement’s primary 
purpose can still render it testimonial.121 Here, the primary purpose was to 
provide information about an illegal substance that could be used against the 
defendant at trial. Because there was “little doubt” that the certificates fell 
within the core class of testimonial statements described in Crawford, the case 
was reversed and remanded so that the lab analyst could appear to testify.122 
Though it was not an extension of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz was significant 
in that it signaled the Court’s unwillingness to create a forensic evidence 
exception to the Crawford rule. The Court discussed and rebutted all six of 
Massachusetts’s main arguments, which revealed the majority’s attitude 
toward confrontation requirements in the forensic evidence context. First, the 
State argued that lab analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are 
not accusatory witnesses.123 Because analysts’ statements alone are insufficient 
to convict, the State argued, the statements only incriminate an individual to 
the extent that the other evidence links the defendant to the results.124 The 
Court rejected this argument, responding that any witness’s testimony alone is 
usually insufficient to convict.125 
The State’s second argument, that lab analysts are not “conventional 
witnesses,” stemmed from the concept developed in Davis that statements are 
nontestimonial when made as an event is being witnessed and testimonial 
                                                      
120 Id. 
121 Jennifer B. Sokoler, Between Substance and Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the 
Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 177 (2010). 
122 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 332–33 (2009). 
123 Id. at 323. 
124 Id. at 323–24. 
125 Id. at 324. 
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when the event being recounted happened in the past. Unlike conventional 
witnesses, the State argued, in performing the test, the lab analyst was making 
near-contemporaneous observations, which rendered the observations 
nontestimonial under Davis.126 The Court countered that the “near-
contemporaneous” nature of the test did not make it actually contemporaneous; 
it concluded that exempting all witnesses who did not observe the crime from 
testifying would effectively exempt all expert witnesses, which the Court was 
unwilling to do.127 
Additionally, the Court disagreed with the State’s arguments that the 
analysts were immune from confrontation because the results fell within a 
business record hearsay exception and the defendant failed to subpoena the 
analyst.128 The Court reasoned that, where a business record is created for use 
at trial, the existence of a hearsay exception is irrelevant for confrontation 
purposes.129 Regarding the defendant’s failure to subpoena the analyst, the 
Court concluded that where confrontation is at issue, the burden is on the 
prosecution to produce adverse witnesses in court.130 
Next, the Court dismissed the State’s argument that individual states would 
be overly burdened if the tests were considered testimonial.131 Citing both the 
right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination as examples, 
the Court responded that it was without authority to relax constitutional 
requirements simply because the prosecution was overburdened.132 It also 
reasoned that the burden would not be as severe as was depicted by the State 
and the dissent.133  
                                                      
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 328, 330. 
129 Id. at 328. 
130 Id. at 330. 
131 Id. at 330–31. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. See infra Part V. 
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Finally, and most significantly, the Court rejected the State’s argument that 
lab analysts were exempt from cross-examination because such evidence is 
“neutral [and] scientific” in nature, and thus the benefits of cross-examining 
analysts are minimal.134 The Court recognized that the State was, in essence, 
asking it to revert back to the Roberts indicia of reliability test in the area of 
forensic evidence by making an exception for “reliable” evidence.135 While 
reiterating that Crawford requires that reliability only be tested through cross-
examination, no matter how reliable the source, the Court also detailed a recent 
National Research Council of the National Academies study, which reported 
widespread error and bias within the forensic testing context.136 Because the 
Court did not need to discuss the reliability of the forensic evidence in order to 
deem the certificates testimonial, this section of the opinion is especially 
significant. This discussion points to the majority’s recognition of overreliance 
on forensic evidence and indicates that it could continue to treat forensic 
evidence as testimonial in future decisions. 
B. Why the Majority Was Right 
1. Lab Analysts Are Human, Too 
As demonstrated by the National Research Council of the National 
Academies study mentioned in Melendez-Diaz, there are serious issues with 
accuracy in forensic labs and very few safeguards in place to ferret out 
errors.137 The reliability of forensic testing depends on the quality of the DNA 
being tested; “the care with which it is collected, labeled, and transported; the 
standards and quality-control procedures of the laboratories performing the 
DNA profile analysis; and the interpretation of the DNA analyzer data,” 
                                                      
134 Id. at 326. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009), Findings and Recommendations, available at  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
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including whether a partial profile (only part of the DNA sequence) or a mixed 
profile (more than one donor) is obtained.138 Opportunities for errors abound in 
the collection, handling, and storage stages, and such errors can result in false 
positives.139 It is clear that the results of even reliable forensic testing methods, 
like DNA testing, can be inaccurate or flawed.140 
Additionally, the lack of comprehensive forensic lab oversight combined 
with the knowledge that any mistake or indiscretion is unlikely to be 
discovered may contribute to analysts being less careful or honest than they 
would be otherwise. Many forensic labs are accountable to the state and report 
to the prosecution,141 and analysts may feel pressured to come to certain 
conclusions. Although it may imply a cynical conclusion, in a report that 
examined the trials of 137 individuals that were found guilty and later 
exonerated, researchers found that most of the analysts that performed the 
incriminating tests used in the trials were employed by state or local law 
enforcement crime laboratories.142 Further, in high-profile cases, it is possible 
that analysts will hear about the cases they are working on and develop their 
own unintentional biases. 
While there have been many examples of particularly egregious cases of 
dishonest or incompetent analysts and labs,143 proficiency tests suggest that the 
                                                      
138 KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at 277. 
139 Id. 
140 See David E. Bernstein, The Unfinished Daubert Revolution, 10 ENGAGE 35, 37 (2009), 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_BernsteinEngage101.pdf. 
141 Sixth Amendment—Witness Confrontation—Testimony of Crime Lab Experts, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 202, 207 (2009). 
142 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 101, at 13. 
143 See, e.g., Christine Funk, Lessons from the Fred Zane Case: Integrity of Forensic Science 
Starts in the Crime Labs, EXAMINER.COM (Apr. 6, 2010),  
http://www.examiner.com/forensic-science-in-minneapolis/lessons-from-the-fred-zain-case-
integrity-of-forensic-science-starts-the-crime-labs; Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, 
Report: HPD Crime Lab Tailored Tests to Theories, CHRON.COM (May 12, 2006), 
http://www.chron.com/news/article/Report-HPD-crime-lab-tailored-tests-to-theories-
1885988.php; Dustin Gardiner, Arizona Crime Labs Need Reform, Experts Say,  
AZCENTRAL.COM (Nov. 19, 2010),  
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true false-positive error rate in DNA testing is 1–2 percent.144 While low 
compared to other forensic technology, this error rate is still incredibly 
threatening to defendants, especially if the jury considers forensic evidence 
infallible. Certainly cross-examination is not sufficient to completely combat 
this margin of error, but it remains a necessary precaution. Because of the risk 
of error and the high stakes involved with forensic testing in criminal 
prosecutions, the reasoning underlying the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz 
is understandable and rational. There should be no question that the performing 
analyst must testify in court. 
2. “Results” Are Often the Analyst’s Subjective Interpretation of the Test 
“Results” of forensic tests are not always clear—they require interpretation 
and analysis.145 Because analysts will interpret and analyze test results 
differently, a specific analyst’s unique interpretation process can be revealed 
through cross-examination. In the same way that several eyewitnesses to the 
same event often have different conclusions about the specifics of the event, 
different analysts testing the same sample can reach different conclusions 
based on their subjective interpretations. 
There is no standard rule for how an analyst should interpret and report 
ambiguous DNA results.146 Ambiguity can result when samples are 
compromised, when they are declared a match based on less than 100 percent 
certainty, when they are erroneously tested against and therefore show a 
perfect match, and when they contain evidence of other DNA profiles that are 
left unexplored. “Where degradation has occurred . . . the profile might be 
considered incomplete. One analyst might decide that these measurements are 




144 Bilz, supra note 103, at 816. 
145 Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 438 (2006). 
146 KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at 282. 
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another might report a partial profile.”147 Indeed, studies of the data underlying 
reports frequently reveal limitations or problems that are not apparent from the 
analyst’s report alone.148 “When faced with ambiguous situations, crime lab 
analysts frequently slant their interpretations in ways that support prosecution 
theories.”149 Without the opportunity for cross-examination, subjective forensic 
determinations are easily interpreted by the jury as fact. 
3. Jurors’ Tendency to Accept Scientific Evidence as Determinative 
That jurors may be more likely to view forensic evidence results as truth due 
to trial depictions in the media has been referred to as the “CSI Effect.”150 This 
concept is supported by depictions of the infallibility of forensic science on 
television shows like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.151 Researchers suggest 
that jurors want to “resolve tensions associated with uncorrected injustice” and 
could therefore be motivated to search for ways to “legitimate their desires to 
convict.”152 Forensic evidence, especially DNA evidence, can provide that 
avenue. Further, it can be more “psychologically satisfying” to convict rather 
than acquit; while there is a desire to acquit the innocent, there is a competing 
desire to achieve justice for the victim (and therefore punish the defendant).153 
Because of the desire to correct an injustice, it may be difficult for a juror to 
see, especially during a trial for a heinous crime, that both the victim and the 
defendant deserve a just outcome.154 In the defendant’s case, a just outcome 
                                                      
147 Id. 
148 William C. Thompson et al., Part 1: Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential 
Elements of a Competent Defense Review, 27 CHAMPION 16, 18 (2003). 
149 Id. 
150 Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in 
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1050 (2006). The “CSI Effect” has also been used 
to refer to the idea that there is a decreased likelihood of conviction where forensic evidence 
is not presented at trial. Id. at 1063. This decreased likelihood of conviction is attributed to 
the public’s heightened expectations of inculpatory evidence resulting from trial depictions 
in the media. Id. 
151 Id. at 1072. 
152 Id. at 1063. 
153 Id. at 1066–67. 
154 Id. at 1075. 
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requires a dedication to truth seeking throughout the trial. Cross-examination 
of the analyst that performed a forensic test used in a trial is therefore 
necessary to help prevent the effects of what one scholar calls “the motivation 
to convict.”155 In requiring that lab analysts testify in court, jurors are less 
likely to take scientific evidence as fact, and, accordingly, more likely to 
preserve their role as fact finders. 
C. The Melendez-Diaz Dissent: Wrong about the Requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause, but Perhaps Understandable in its Concern with the 
Practical Implications of the Majority’s Decision 
1. Melendez-Diaz Elucidated, But Did Not Expand upon, the Definition 
of ‘Testimonial’ Set out in Crawford and Davis 
In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Alito, he argues that Melendez-Diaz “undoes” law governing the 
admission of scientific evidence, which had been established for ninety 
years.156 The dissent distinguishes Melendez-Diaz from both Crawford and 
Davis because those cases involved “conventional witnesses,” though that 
phrase is never relied upon or mentioned in the decisions of Crawford or 
Davis.157 Including scientific evidence in the “testimonial” definition and 
considering a lab analyst as a witness were concepts certainly not precluded by 
either Crawford or Davis. The dissent claims that the holding in Melendez-
Diaz is “driven by nothing more than a wooden application of the Crawford 
and Davis definition of ‘testimonial,’ divorced from any guidance from 
history, precedent, or common sense”158 simply because neither Crawford nor 
Davis specifically indicated whether lab analysts and their testimony would 
qualify as testimonial. This argument, however, fails to explain why the 
                                                      
155 Id. at 1071. 
156 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 333 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. at 343. 
158 Id. at 337. 
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certificates at issue did not fall within the core testimonial evidence established 
in Crawford and Davis. 
Categorizing forensic certificates as testimonial does follow from Crawford 
and Davis: the certificates were formal affidavits, the assertions contained in 
the certificates were made under circumstances that would lead an objective 
witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial, and the certificates were the functional equivalent to live, in-court 
testimony.159 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer joined the Crawford 
majority,160 and all four of the Justices in the Melendez-Diaz dissent joined the 
majority opinion in Davis.161 While the fact that the rules set out in Crawford 
and Davis rejected the indicia of reliability test from Ohio v. Roberts may 
appear startling, every dissenting justice at one point thought it a necessary 
change to make. 
2. The Majority’s Holding Does Advance the Purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause 
The dissent claims that confronting a laboratory analyst will not cause the 
analyst to change his or her opinion due to the analyst’s neutrality.162 The 
dissent’s position is that an analyst would not retract a prior conclusion upon 
seeing the defendant, as a “conventional witness” might, because an analyst is 
far removed from the situation and claims no personal investment in the 
defendant’s guilt.163 This argument, however, goes to the heart of how many 
have come to view scientific evidence. In assuming that test results are simply 
objective, neutral facts, the dissent sees requiring an analyst to testify as a 
                                                      
159 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
830 (2006). While the certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz happened to fall within three 
separate categories of testimony, they only needed to fall within one to be considered 
testimonial. 
160 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37. 
161 Davis, 547 U.S. at 814. 
162 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 338–39. 
163 Id. 
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meaningless charade, or, worse, as a way to let the guilty “go free.”164 In fact, 
as discussed above, subjective opinions, outside evidence, and innocent 
mistakes contribute to erroneous test results, and a defendant, whose liberty is 
at stake, deserves to have the opportunity to cross-examine the test-performing 
analyst in order to uncover any possible errors or sources of bias. 
The dissent also distinguishes lab analysts from conventional witnesses in 
that a lab analyst typically does not respond to questions under interrogation—
“they are not dependent upon or controlled by interrogation of any sort.”165 
While not subject to specific interrogation methods of state officers, forensic 
labs and analysts will likely only perform a forensic analysis if prompted to by 
police officers or the prosecution, to whom they are often accountable.166 To 
argue that a defendant should not be able to confront a lab analyst because the 
analyst is completely independent is to disregard the reality of how the forensic 
testing system is often structured. 
3. Application of Crawford Does Not Impose an Undue Burden on the 
States 
Of all the dissent’s criticisms, its most significant argument (and perhaps the 
concern underlying its other arguments) is that Melendez-Diaz’s application of 
Crawford to forensic evidence will have an unduly burdensome effect on 
states. Indeed, Melendez-Diaz has already made some criminal prosecutions 
less efficient.167 And requiring analysts that may have no recollection of 
                                                      
164 Id. at 341. 
165 Id. at 343. 
166 Sixth Amendment—Witness Confrontation—Testimony of Crime Lab Experts, supra note 
141, at 207. 
167 Martin F. Murphy & Marian T. Ryan, Melendez-Diaz, One Year Later, 54 THE BOS. BAR 
JOURNAL 24, 25 (2010) (“In the year following that decision, one thing is absolutely clear: 
cases raising challenges based on Melendez-Diaz have occupied an extraordinary amount of 
attention from this state’s appellate courts. In the first fifteen months following the Supreme 
Court’s opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court have 
decided 164 appeals raising Melendez-Diaz challenges: The SJC decided 15 and the Appeals 
Court 149 (22 by published opinion; 127 by unpublished Rule 1:28 opinions.) In nearly all of 
these cases, defense lawyers have challenged the admission of two kinds of certificates 
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performing a specific forensic test to appear to testify may, at first blush, seem 
like a waste of time. However, even those analysts who truly do not remember 
a specific analysis can provide valuable information on cross-examination, like 
his or her particular interpretation methods or precision. Confrontation “‘was 
meant to weed out [both] the fraudulent analyst and the incompetent one . . .’ 
The incompetent analyst can be weeded out whether or not she has a memory 
of performing the test” and, for the fraudulent analyst, “just the prospect of 
being called to the stand and subjected to cross-examination may well deter 
some fraud from ever occurring.”168 
Any inefficiency caused by Melendez-Diaz is not only surmountable, but 
may cause the forensic testing process to change in ways that make the results 
themselves more accurate. States that hope to avoid having to require multiple 
analysts who work on a sample to testify could change procedures so that only 
one analyst performs tests on a sample and interprets the results, and a 
supervisor (who cannot testify) verifies the results. This would decrease the 
chance of sample adulteration through degradation and still ensure that more 
than one individual has checked and verified the results. Especially in the drug 
context, Melendez-Diaz may also force the state to prosecute the most serious 
charges first. For instance, Massachusetts recently decriminalized possession 
of one ounce or less of marijuana—this means that analysts are no longer using 
lab time to analyze drugs in most marijuana possession cases.169 This time can 
now be more efficiently spent on work related to more serious charges. 
Of course, at bottom, “convenience and efficiency are not the primary 
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”170 As one scholar 
                                                                                                                  
which were commonly admitted as a substitute for expert testimony in criminal cases in the 
years before Melendez-Diaz: drug certificates of the kind at issue in Melendez-Diaz itself, 
and similar certificates prepared by police ballisticians, offered by the prosecution in gun 
cases, attesting that a gun seized from a defendant is in fact a functioning firearm.”). 
168 G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 
43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 78 (2009). 
169 Murphy & Ryan, supra note 167, at 26. 
170 Fenner, supra note 168, at 80 n.207. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1943)). 
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aptly points out, “one may not very well argue that we should do away with the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to a trial by 
jury, or the right to confront witnesses because things would be cheaper and 
quicker if we did away with them.”171 Once a constitutional right comes into 
play, the practical consequences of recognizing that right are no longer a 
concern of the Court; after Crawford, whether forensic evidence is testimonial 
cannot be driven by policy considerations.172 In sum, it may be that the 
dissent’s reluctance to consider forensic evidence testimonial, cloaked in 
disputes over “conventional witnesses” and the minimal benefit derived in 
confronting a lab analyst, is a result of the perceived inefficiency of Melendez-
Diaz and the possibility of high costs to states. However, the “enormous”173 
change required by Crawford and its progeny in the way forensic evidence is 
admitted in criminal trials simply highlights the extent to which defendants 
have been deprived of their confrontation rights in the past; this change should 
have been implemented long ago. In absolutely every case in which forensic 
testimony is admitted against an individual, that individual should have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the creator of the forensic testimony. 
III. CIRCUMVENTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ 
Under Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, where the primary purpose of a 
forensic report is its use in a future criminal proceeding, the analyst’s report 
cannot be admitted into evidence unless the analyst-witness is both unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.174 While the 
apparent vagueness surrounding the definitions of “testimony” and who 
constitutes a “witness” in the forensic testing context has undoubtedly 
contributed to confusion among lower courts, the real issue seems to be the 
                                                      
171 Id. at 79 n.206. 
172 Joe Bourne, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When Is a Lab Report 
Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079 (2009). 
173 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 340 (2009). 
174 Id. at 322. 
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perceived inefficiency and cost of applying the clear rule, and the lingering 
belief that forensic testing always produces accurate results. This section will 
detail a common method states are using to avoid being bound by this new 
case law and two Supreme Court cases that deal with the constitutionality of 
lab analysts not testifying. 
A. “Stealth Testimonial Hearsay”175 
Oddly, even after Crawford, it is a fairly common practice for judges to 
allow expert witnesses to testify regarding the expert’s opinion of testimonial 
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. For example, the prosecution 
may hire an expert witness to review a forensic report and testify in court 
regarding her opinion of that report; the lab analyst herself is not required to 
appear in court. The actual report may or may not be admitted into evidence. In 
what Julie Seaman calls “stealth testimonial hearsay,” inadmissible hearsay is 
“smuggled in” through the expert’s opinion.176 Absent confrontation concerns, 
this practice is permitted under Evidence Rule (ER) 703, which provides: 
[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to 
the expert at or before the hearing. . . . If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence 
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.177 
Thus, ER 703 allows the expert to base her opinion on facts unique to the case 
and not found by or even known to the jury.178 
ER 703’s “reasonably relied upon” standard (that is, the requirement that the 
facts or data are of a type reasonably relied on in forming opinions on the 
subject), which would be easily met for most types of forensic evidence, is 
                                                      
175 See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries 
of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827 (2008). 
176 Id. at 835. 
177 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added). 
178 Seaman, supra note 175, at 838–39. 
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obviously very similar to the indicia of reliability test overruled in Roberts. In 
the same way that the Roberts test took away the defendant’s opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses by admitting hearsay if the judge deemed it reliable, 
so ER 703 takes away both the jury’s and the defendant’s opportunities to 
assess the reliability of the underlying report—the expert need only find the 
report reasonably reliable, and it can be admitted without the creator of the 
report present to testify. 
Clearly, however, testimonial hearsay that is admissible under the Rules of 
Evidence is not admissible if it violates the Constitution. Trial courts have 
rejected constitutional challenges to stealth testimonial hearsay, though, 
reasoning that, even if testimonial, the underlying reports are not hearsay (an 
out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted) because the 
reports are offered as a basis for experts’ opinions and not for the truth of the 
matter asserted (the results of the report).179 Crawford only governs testimonial 
hearsay.180 This completely immunizes the report itself from cross-
examination, since the analyst will not be required to appear. While proponents 
of this method have argued that Crawford is satisfied because the expert 
witness is present to be cross-examined, the only testimony that is legitimately 
available for the defense to question is the expert’s personal opinion of the 
report. When the forensic test result report is not itself admitted and the expert 
bases her opinion on the report, courts reason that Crawford is not violated 
because the report is simply acting as the basis for the expert’s opinion, and 
not offered for its truth—therefore, according to these courts, while the report 
is testimonial, it is not hearsay, and does not come within Crawford’s reach.181 
Stealth testimonial hearsay violates the defendant’s right to confront 
witnesses. The argument that the report is not hearsay because it is not offered 
for its truth when it provides the basis for an expert’s opinion is a fiction. The 
jury cannot realistically be expected to assess the validity of the expert’s 
                                                      
179 Id. at 846. 
180 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
181 Id. 
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opinion without considering the truth of the underlying report, especially when 
coupled with the possible tendency jurors may have to take forensic evidence 
as fact.182 The outcome of Mr. Lui’s case, detailed above, will likely turn on 
whether the Supreme Court of the United States is willing to accept this fiction 
or whether it will recognize that this practice violates Crawford. The Court 
began to answer this question in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, below, and has 
the opportunity to clearly answer it in Williams v. Illinois. 
B. Bullcoming v. New Mexico183 
Bullcoming presented a similar, but not identical question to the stealth 
testimonial hearsay issue presented in Lui: when a forensic report is offered 
into evidence to prove its truth, is a defendant’s confrontation right satisfied 
when a supervisor with no role in producing the report appears and is subject 
to cross-examination regarding the report?184 This question arose out of a 2005 
driving-while-intoxicated case in New Mexico in which blood was drawn and 
used against the defendant in court.185 
Donald Bullcoming had rear-ended a truck; there were no injuries and only 
minor damage to the vehicles.186 However, he left the scene and the driver of 
the truck called the police.187 Police quickly found Mr. Bullcoming and noticed 
that he appeared intoxicated.188 After he declined to submit to field sobriety 
tests and a breath test, the police drove him to a local hospital where his blood 
was drawn.189 The blood sample was signed in and stored, and analyst Curtis 
Caylor tested the sample the next day.190 In his report, Mr. Caylor wrote down 
that the blood sample contained an alcohol concentration of .21 grams per 
                                                      
182 Tyler, supra note 150, at 1063. 
183 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2705 (2011). 
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hundred milliliters, declared that the seal of the sample was received intact and 
broken in the laboratory, and certified that he followed the procedures required 
on the report.191 
Mr. Bullcoming was charged with Driving While Intoxicated.192 On the day 
of the trial, the state informed Mr. Bullcoming that the analyst who performed 
the forensic test, Curtis Caylor, would not be testifying and that Gerasimos 
Razatos, another analyst, would be testifying instead.193 There was no claim 
made that Mr. Caylor was unavailable.194 Mr. Bullcoming argued that this 
substitution violated the confrontation clause under Crawford.195 The trial 
court disagreed on the grounds that the report did not fall under Crawford’s 
definition of “testimonial” and it admitted the report under the business record 
exception to the hearsay rule.196 
The report was admitted and another analyst, Mr. Razatos, was allowed to 
testify.197 On cross-examination, Mr. Razatos conceded that he had not 
observed the testing or reviewed Mr. Caylor’s analysis in the lab and stated 
that “you don’t know unless you actually observe the analysis that someone 
else conducts, whether they followed the protocol in every instance.”198 
Interestingly, Mr. Razatos also revealed that Mr. Caylor had been put on 
unpaid leave.199 Nonetheless, Mr. Bullcoming was found guilty and sentenced 
to two years in prison, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.200 The New 
Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari, but while the case was pending, the 
                                                      
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 2711. 
193 Id. at 2711–12. 
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US Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that forensic reports are 
testimonial.201 
Despite the outcome of the Melendez-Diaz decision, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court still did not acknowledge that Mr. Bullcoming’s right to 
confrontation had been violated. While forced to concede that the report was 
testimonial, the court shifted the question to the sufficiency of the testimony of 
the surrogate witness, Mr. Razatos:202 the New Mexico Supreme Court held 
that Mr. Ratatos’s in-court testimony was sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s 
right to confront witnesses against him.203 
Allowing a substitute, unrelated analyst to appear in the place of the lab 
analyst who performed a test violated the defendant’s rights under the 
confrontation clause for the reasons stated in the preceding sections. The way 
this case went through the state system, however, is especially telling. First, the 
trial court held that the evidence was nontestimonial, and so Crawford did not 
apply.204 When Crawford had to apply—that is, when the US Supreme Court 
clearly held that forensic certificates of analysis are testimonial—the New 
Mexico Supreme Court used yet another strategy, taking the stance that an 
unrelated, substitute lab analyst is a “witness,” in order to artificially comply 
with the Crawford framework.205 The New Mexico Supreme Court went to 
great lengths to avoid complying with the clear confrontation requirement. 
The question at issue in Bullcoming and the treatment of that question in the 
lower state courts are likely results of the concepts discussed in this article: a 
still-prevalent idea that forensic results are unwaveringly accurate, the general 
desire to convict defendants when a wrong has occurred, and cost and 
efficiency concerns. In holding that the confrontation clause is not satisfied 
when an analyst who did not perform or observe the test presented testifies and 
                                                      
201 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 322 (2009). 
202 State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 9 (2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 6. 
205 Id. at 8–9. 
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that a defendant has the right to confront the analyst who performed the test 
unless the analyst is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination, the US Supreme Court took the appropriate first step of 
answering who must testify by applying the basic principles of Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz concerning what is testimonial hearsay. The underlying 
principle of Crawford—that a defendant is not afforded a fair trial when he is 
denied the opportunity to confront the witness against him—is what should be 
honored, no matter what technology is involved. 
C. Williams v. Illinois 
The facts of Williams are as follows. In 2000, a woman was raped and 
robbed.206 A rape kit was sent to the Illinois State Police Crime lab for 
testing.207 The lab confirmed the presence of semen, and the sample was sent 
to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in Maryland, who derived a DNA 
profile.208 The defendant was later arrested for an unrelated offense and, 
pursuant to a court order, his blood was drawn, tested, and a DNA profile 
derived.209 The profile was entered into the crime lab’s DNA database.210 A 
forensic biologist who did not have a part in either test testified that the DNA 
profile from the semen sample and the profile from the defendant’s blood 
sample matched.211 As an expert witness, the biologist testified to the match at 
the defendant’s trial, and neither of the individuals who performed the 
underlying DNA tests testified.212 While the expert’s testimony was certainly 
important for the purpose of cross-examination regarding her personal opinion 
that the two samples matched, the testimony of the analysts that created the 
underlying DNA profiles was important for the purpose of cross-examination 
                                                      
206 People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 270 (2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 
2011) (No. 10-8505). 
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208 Id. at 271. 
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regarding the creation of that profile that led to the match. Without this 
underlying testimony, the expert’s testimony constituted stealth testimonial 
hearsay. 
To predict how Williams may come out, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Bullcoming is significant. While Justice Ginsburg led the Court in the 
application of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to Mr. Bullcoming’s situation in a 
5-4 decision, Justice Sotomayor hinted that she is ready to draw a line in 
Williams. Besides offering a proposal that states may suggest a purpose for a 
report besides its use at trial,213 which would avoid a confrontation problem 
under Crawford’s and Davis’s definitions of “testimonial,” Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized that the rule in Bullcoming may be limited to its narrow facts.214 In 
Bullcoming, the surrogate witness that testified to the results of the forensic 
report had no role in producing the report or observing the testing. Sotomayor 
said that “it would be a different case if” either 1) a supervisor who observed 
an analyst conduct the test testified about the results of the report, or 2) an 
expert witness testified as to her independent opinion about the underlying 
reports not admitted into evidence (stealth testimonial hearsay), both of which 
would insulate the actual analyst from cross-examination.215 Two justices in 
the Melendez-Diaz majority (Justice Stevens and Justice Souter) have since 
been replaced with Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor. The four Melendez-
Diaz dissenters are all still on the Court. Therefore, Justice Sotomayor could 
join the Melendez-Diaz dissent to create a majority if she believes that stealth 
testimonial hearsay is acceptable. 
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s hint that an expert’s testimony can satisfy the 
defendant’s right to confront the analyst who created a forensic report, not 
considering a report hearsay because it was not admitted but was used by an 
                                                      
213 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“[T]his is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less an 
alternate primary purpose, for the BAC report. For example, the State has not claimed that 
the report was necessary to provide Bullcoming with medical treatment.”). 
214 Id. at 2722. 
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expert witness to arrive at her opinion is illogical because the defendant is no 
less threatened by the report and is prevented from confronting the testing 
analyst(s). If the underlying test results are incorrect, so are the expert’s 
opinions about the results. Instead, this situation should still be resolved by 
looking to Crawford’s basic rule: testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless a 
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.216 The Court should continue to apply the basic principles of 
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to Williams, finding that underlying reports are 
still testimonial even if they are not admitted and only provide a basis for an 
expert witness’s “independent opinion”—and should find the admission of 
stealth testimonial hearsay unconstitutional. 
IV. CHANGES IN FORENSIC STRUCTURE AND PROSECUTORIAL 
PRACTICES THAT MAY AID WITH CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
COMPLIANCE 
While the cost and efficiency of recognizing a constitutional right is not a 
concern of the Court, the volume of articles and briefs that focus on possible 
costs and inefficiencies of requiring a lab analyst to appear at trial indicate that 
practical concerns do indeed impact this issue. In an amicus brief submitted on 
behalf of the respondent in Bullcoming, various state actors argued that 
requiring the prosecution to call the author of a forensic report it seeks to admit 
against a defendant would inhibit the development of efficient laboratory 
procedures that involve more than one centralized analyst.217 There is a 
growing practice in forensic laboratories to use “high-volume processing” of 
evidence samples, meaning teams of analysts work on many samples instead of 
                                                      
216 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). 
217 Brief for the States of California, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin, Wyoming as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, 8, Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876). 
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just one.218 Therefore, multiple analysts are responsible for one result of a test 
in a given case. 
It is true that requiring an entire team of analysts that worked on a single 
sample to appear, which could arguably be required under Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz, would be a significant cost to states. However, this “high-
volume processing” practice is itself questionable. When multiple analysts are 
responsible for different parts of the data-collecting process, the process is at 
an even greater risk of being inaccurate: there may be too many cooks in the 
kitchen. If the Supreme Court deems stealth testimonial hearsay 
unconstitutional in Williams, forcing lab analysts to appear in court, it would 
likely discourage high-volume processing, which would in turn likely help 
improve accuracy of the forensic testing process. Having only one lab analyst 
work on a sample is the norm in many jurisdictions. For example, in 
Washington State, only one analyst will work on a sample.219 Testifying in 
court based on that sample “is not characterized as imposing on analysts an 
additional demand separable from their case work”—it is just part of the job.220 
Requiring that the author of a forensic report appear in court would place 
considerable pressure on jurisdictions using high-volume processing, which 
would reduce the number of analysts working on a sample and could increase 
accuracy in results. 
Somewhat related is the notion that specifically requiring the author of a 
forensic report to appear in court will cause states to suffer an overwhelming 
cost. The Bullcoming amicus brief submitted on behalf of the State also cites to 
this cost and the burden on lab analysts as a reason that the specific lab analyst 
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219 As we saw in Lui, however, samples that are aged, degraded, or have extraordinarily low 
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who performed a test should not be required to appear in court.221 The general 
idea is that, “in the real world of modern forensic toxicology analysis,” this 
practice is just not feasible.222 Again, however, the practices of many states 
demonstrate that the amicus claim simply is not true.223 Examples of cities that 
already call the analysts who examined the evidence, drew the conclusion, or 
wrote the report are: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, Colorado; San Francisco, 
California; Oakland, California; Seattle, Washington; Chicago, Illinois; and 
Anchorage, Alaska.224  
This practice is a result of a general recognition on the part of prosecutors 
that the analyst who produced the report is an important source of 
incriminating evidence against the defendant; relatedly, the analyst that 
produced the report is often the prosecution’s most powerful witness.225 The 
prosecution often calls the analyst to testify in order to strengthen its case.226 
While all jurisdictions that already require the analyst that performed the test to 
appear “have their own unique demands and challenges,” “all of them 
manage.”227 The burden of requiring the author of a forensic report to appear is 
further assuaged by placing analysts on call so that they can come to the 
courthouse just before their testimony is needed, by allowing the analyst’s 
testimony to be taken out of order when she arrives, and by efforts made by 
prosecutors to schedule multiple cases for the same day.228 
Finally, besides the fact that stealth testimonial hearsay is based on a fiction 
that a forensic report providing the basis for an expert’s opinion is not hearsay 
because it is not offered for its truth, allowing experts to testify instead of the 
lab analyst who actually performed the test would discourage lab analysts from 
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ever testifying at all. In the forensic context, Crawford and Melendez-Diaz 
could be rendered meaningless. While having the lab analyst is a powerful tool 
for the prosecution, an expert witness testifying to the results is undoubtedly a 
more powerful one. Any expert witness could testify as to her opinion 
regarding the results of the test, and, because of misconceptions regarding the 
accuracy of forensic evidence discussed above, jurors would be likely to listen. 
Since lab analysts who performed the tests would no longer be required to 
testify, the potential beneficial changes in forensic testing practices that could 
lead to more accurate results (reducing the number of analysts that work on a 
sample) would not occur. In cases involving forensic evidence, therefore, 
Williams has the capacity to make Crawford and Melendez-Diaz a flash in the 
pan.  
CONCLUSION 
The indisputable value of DNA and other forensic technologies, and the 
potential costs of complying with Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, should not 
corrode a criminal defendant’s invaluable right to confront witnesses against 
him. Like any other type of evidence, there is the risk of error, which is 
exacerbated by forensic evidence’s perceived infallibility and various methods 
used by states to evade Crawford, namely stealth testimonial hearsay. An 
interest in the accuracy of criminal proceedings where forensic evidence has 
been admitted and our notions of a fair trial require a measured approach to 
interpreting new technologies as they make their way into the courtroom. To 
make sure that defendants like Mr. Lui receive fair trials in the face of damning 
forensic evidence, the need for confrontation of the lab analyst behind the 
testing process is plain. 
 
